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ABSTRACT 
The question of Turkey's accession to the European Union has been vastly under-theorized. This 
study uses a constructivist form of realism in order to explain the positions taken by France, Germany, 
and Great Britain on the question of Turkey's membership in the EU. So far Turkey's accession process 
has mainly been described in terms of human rights violations, the Kurkish question, and in terms of 
satisfying the Copenhagen criteria. This study makes an attempt to explain the issue at hand in terms of 
the balance of power' theory. It will be the core of my. argument that the question of Turkish 
membership to the EU deals· with a broader question of power politiCS. Although European integration 
remains a theoretically challenging subject for realists, and neo-realists alike, this paper suggests a more 
ideational approach to the study of European integration in general. 
INTRODUCTION 
It was Mustafa Kema' AtatUrk, the founder of the Turkish Republic and its first President, whose 
vision of a secular, Westernized state, established modem Turkey in 1923. Ever since, Turkey has long 
sought ever-closer ties with Europe and the United States. -Successive Turkish governments have 
looked into Western organizations and institutions to form alliances and realize foreign policy 
objectives.(Yildiz and Muller 2008, p. 21) Turkey's accession process to the European Union (EU) has 
given rise to considerable debate among existing Member States and their populace. The EU, 
throughout its history, has gone through five waves of enlargement, resulting in the current 27 Member 
States. And although Turkey has been and still continues to be closely tied with Western Europe, it has 
not been generally considered an appropriate member of the EU. In turn, Turkey's accession process has 
been an unusually long one, relative to other states. The question of Turkey's membership in the 
European Union has been mainly characterized by a persistent opposition to its accession, owing to the 
divergent interests of various EU Member States as well as the United States. This has resulted in a very 
strenuous negotiation process and Turkey's questioning of EU's real intentions and interest. Opposition 
has been based mainly on the following grounds: Turkey's grave human rights violations, its inability to 
satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria, the unresolved Kutdish and Cyprus questions, claims that Turkey is not 
European enough politically and that geographically it is not in continental Europe and thus does not 
qualify as a potential member state (see, for example, Murphy 2004; Walker2007-08; Yildiz and Muller 
2008). However, these issues alone do not capture the scope of apprehension over Turkish accession, 
for they do not take into consideration a greater global conception of the European Union in the 
geopolitical context. Thus, there exists another dimension to understanding the question of Turkish 
accession process to the EU. This dimension deals with two separate ideas of the European Union and 
consequently about its role in global politics: the more political or Franco-German conception and the 
predominantly economic or British-US vision of Europe. Turkish membership of the EU could well tip the 
balance in favour of one or the other of these two visions. This may provide a deeper explanation of 
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why Turkey membership has become so controversial. Thus, the main purpose of this paper will be to 
describe and explain this process from a realist perspective. Having examined several theoretical 
approaches, t have come to a conclusion that a neo-realist account works best in explaining the 
assertively sought support of and aggressively-heated opposition to Turkey's accession. to the EU. 
However, an exclusively neo-realist approach will not be sufficient on its own. A constructivist form of 
realism will be necessary in order to explain conflicting ideas about European Union, its role in the global 
politics, as well as its future. For this soie purpose, I have chosen Kenneth N. Waltz's Theory of 
Internationa.1 Politics as a theoretical book for my analysis of Turkey's accession process to the EU. 
Primarily because balance of power theory, as presented by Waltz, possesses considerable capacity to 
explain the balancing behavior of states. The author's main concern in Theory of International Politics 
regards the distribution of power in the international system and how it influences states' behaviour. 
In short, this study.set out to explain the stances of various European Union Member States on 
the question of Turkey's membership of the EU from a realist point of view. However, moving beyond 
the scope of hard-core neo-realism, we explicitly suggest in this essay that Turkey's accession to the 
European Union in particular, and the process of European integration in general, can better be 
explained in constructive realist terms. Primarily because such an approach takes into account core 
realist assumptions about power' and emphasizes core constructivist assumptions about the role of 
ideas' in international relations. Thus it is suggested that constructivist form of realism is helpful in 
explaining central feature of European politics in the light of Franco-German opposition to and British-
American support of Turkish accession to the European Union. The theoretical part of this paper outlines 
major constructive realist and realist concepts which might be helpful in understanding the behaviour of 
key states in relation to the· process of regional integration, alliance formation, and the ba.lance of 
power. The empirical part of the study seeks to apply and illustrate the relevance of this conceptual 
framework. The empirical part of this essay tries to explain positions taken by various EU Member States 
regarding Turkey's membership in the European Union. 
THE HISTORY 
Turkey's path towards institutional integration into Western Europe began in the late 1940s, 
when it became an original member of the Council of Europe, and the early 1950s, when it joined the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. As Turkey pursued closer relations with Europe, it 
applied, in 1957, for associate membership of the then nascent European Common Market (ECM), later 
known as the European Economic Community (EEC) and finally the European Union (EU). In 1963, 
Turkey entered into an Association Agreement with the EEC. The Association Agreement offered Turkey 
a possibility of a future membership within the Union. It covered a broad spectrum of trade-related 
issues and various other areas of cooperation, and was intended as a step towards an eventual customs 
union. (Yildiz and Muller 2008, p. 21) In November of 1970 an Additional Protocol was signed, in which 
rules for a customs union were outlined between the EEC and Turkey. (Grigoriadis 2006, p. 148) The 
fact that Turkey participated as a full member in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) in 1973-75 and became a founding member of the issuing Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), further symbolized Turkey's pro-Western orientation. These promising 
developments, however, were short-lived. For nearly a decade thereafter relations between the 
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Community and Turkey stifled, partly due to the question of Cyprus. It was not until the'late 1980s that 
the relationship between the European Community (EC) and Turkey began to improve again. Turkey's 
filed a· formal application for futt membership of the EC in 1987. But the application was rejected in 
1989 as the Community concluded that it would be inappropriate for the Community ... to become 
involved in accession negotiations at this stage. (Vildiz and Muller 2008, p. 21) However despite such a 
disappointment dose ties continued to grow. In 1995, Turkey and the EU signed a Customs Union 
agreement, which came into effect in '1996. As the critical EU-Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 
approached, Turkey's political liberalization seemed to proceed at a surprising pace. (Grigoriadis 2006, 
p.148) Yet, Turkey's application was once again shelved, as the Copenhagen Summit decided to defer 
its decision until the Summit in 2004. Finally, as expected, on October 6th, 2004, the recommendations 
issued by the European Commission concluded that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the criteria 
necessary to open accession 'negotiations. (Yildiz and Muller 2008, p. 24) Starting date for Turkey's 
accession negotiations to the European Union were set for October 3rd, 2005. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
In order to construct a theory of international politics Waltz makes a necessary distinction 
between domestic and international politics. He defines both domestic and international political 
structure first by the principle by which it is ordered or organized, then by the differentiation and 
specification of its units, and lastly by the distribution of capabilities across these units. (Waltz, 88) 
However, the aforementioned distinction between the domestic and the international is necessary in 
order to explicitly portray the rationale behind the behaviour of units, namely the alliance formation. 
For "it is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states" (Waltz 1979, p. 65) 
since the structure of the domestic system (hierarchy) is different from the structure of the international 
system (anarchy). A structural approach, on the other hand, allows for the parsimonious explanation of 
the similar behaviour among diverse units. Since we are concerned with international relations, I will not 
focus deeply on domestic political structures of the units although it is immeasurably important for 
constructive form of realism. lack of central authority within international system is the fundamental 
basis of Waltz theoretical framework. Such international-political systems are formed by coactions of 
self-regarding units. (Waltz 1979, p. 91) Because there is no overarching government or governance that 
rules over such units their motivation has to be assumed rather than described in realistic terms. Thus, 
Waltz assumes that all states seek to ensure their own survival. In comparison to domestic system, 
security under anarchy is not guaranteed. Because of the self~help system and the uncertainty of other 
units, states' focus shifts from absolute gains towards relative gains. Since all of the units under anarchy 
are in a self-help system, there is no functional differentiation among them, all are legally equal. 
However, Waltz further applies his analogy of economic thinking of domestic system to the international 
structure in order to pOint out that we, the students of international politiCS, ought to focus mostly upon 
'large firms', namely relatively powerful states. This is due to the fact that the difference between those 
units that matter and those that don't are the differences of capability, not of function.(Waltz 1979, p. 
96) Similarly, although it is acknowledged by Waltz that there are non-state actors that exist in the 
international system, their relevance is miniscule comparing to a state actor. The two explicitly stated, 
relevant characteristics of the international system, therefore, are anarchy and relative capability of 
states. Furthermore, Waltz explores the question of anarchy and the balance of power. He explicitly 
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states that cooperation among states is possibte,-and indeed often desired. However, such cooperation 
is possible "only in ways strongly conditioned by the anarchy of the larger system." (Waltz 1979, p. 116) 
Continuing on the point,. he further states that anarchy of that system strongly affects the likelihood of 
cooperation. Such cooperation is primarily driven by the balance-of-power theory, where states are 
unitary actors who seek, at a minimum, their own preservation and, at a maximum, universal 
domination. (Waltz 1979, p. 118) States are determined to achieve their ends by, internally, increasing 
economiccapabi.ities and military strength and, externally, by strengthening and enlarging their 
alliances or weakening the opposing ones. 
Although indispensable to this essay, a purely neo-realist approach will not suffice on its own. 
For, the thrust of argumentation presented within this paper will be inadequately portrayed, and could 
possibly be rendered as flawed. Thus, in order to fully understand the absolute vigour of the argument 
at hand, a more ideational approach is ne~ded. One such theoretical approach bridging the (neo-)realist 
and ideational spheres has been referred to as constructive realism. In thi.s fusion of approaches the end 
product may be summarized as a constructive form of realism that takes ideas seriously as objects of 
analysis. Constructive-realism is- a hybrid-theoretical approach that bridges the power-idea gap. It takes 
into account core realist assumptions about power' and emphasizes core constructivist assumptions 
about the role of ideas' in international relations. (Barkin 2003, SQ>rensen 2008) In this sense, both 
realism and constructivism complement each other to a certain degree. Alexander Wendt, a prominent 
social constructivist, concluded, for example, that the power and interest have the effects they do in 
virtue of the ideas that make them up. (Wendt 1999, p. 135) The rationale behind such thinking is that 
the distribution of power in international relations is primarily constituted by distribution of interests 
among states, and the essence of states' interests is in turn constituted by ideas. (Wendt 1999, p. 135) 
For this particular reason this theoretical approach of the study of .. .ideas, is integral to a full 
understanding of international politics. (Bark;n 2003, p. 336) 
Ideas give meaning to the material forces and states' actions. As such the role of power and 
interest in state's foreign policy is reinforced by the state's ideational beliefs. Indeed, the central thesis 
in Wendt's argument is that the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of 
ideas. (Wendt 1999, p. 96) In other words, how states act in the international relations, and what 
interests they hofd, as well as the structure within which they operate are defined by states' ideas. This 
is consistent with Morgenthau suggestion that a nation-state's foreign policy ought to be rational in 
view of its own moral and practical purposes.{Morgenthau 1985, p. 10) Thus, a state ought to act in 
accordance with its ideas and perception of itself and its role in the international system. This ideational 
or constructive form of realism, as such, grants considerable explanatory weight to both material and 
ideational forces in international relations. Material forces matter in that states actions depend upon 
relative distribution of power among states; Ideational forces (ideas) . matter in that ideas too explain 
aspects of state behaviour. States actions are constituted by the role of belief systems and perceptions 
in foreign policy decision-making. In SQ>rensen's words quoting Max Weber, this constructive form of 
realism offers students of international relations an "interpretive understanding of social action" 
combined with "causal explanation of its course and effects" (qtd. in SQ>rensen 2008, p. 13). 
On the final note, one of the most essential arguments that needs to be explicitly stated is that 
there are no compelfing ontological or epistemological obstacles to the ambition of supporting an 
approach that considers both material and ideational forces;{S0rensen 2008, p. 13; Wendt 1999, p. 92-
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138; Barkin 2003, p. 338) Indeed, in explaining Waltz's systematic conceptualization of international 
material structure, Wendt argues that Waltz's model can only explain what it purports to explain by 
relying on an implicit model of the distribution of interests, and insofar as interests are themselves 
material (defined in terms of power) Wendt's argument does not violate the spirit of Neorealism, and 
can be seen as a friendly amendment to the theory.(Wendt 199, p. 97) There are, in other words, 
strategic and ideational forces that determine states' actions. Atl in all, "material power matters, but so 
do ideas".(S0rensen 2008,14) 
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
Two Visions of Europe 
Since the idea of the European Union was conceived, its Member States as well as the European 
citizens in general have been preoccupied with the question of what is to become of Europe, and what 
role the European Un.ion is to play on the international arena. Jose Cutileiro, in Duas Visoes da -Europa, 
comments that since the early 19705 the debate on the European project has been primarily dominated 
by two divergent visions of EUrope. On one side of the debate is the French vision of a European Union 
which emphasizes the idea that Europe is to converge into a single political entity that should speak with 
one voice. In this vision, individual Member States submit their sovereignty to a supra national EU 
government. Europe's global role in such a context is that of an ,international power player. Contrary to 
this European ideal, on the other side of the debate, is the Engtish vision' of Europe as a' mainly 
economic, trade, and financial power. British European ideal envisions European Union as an instrument 
of global stability, but anchored within the transatlantic alliance. (Cutileiro, 2005) Whether Turkey 
successfully accedes to the EU or finds itself abandoned, may largely depend upon which vision of 
Europe triumphs. It is therefore essential to establish a clear understanding of these two divergent 
visions of Europe and what do they mean for Turkey. 
Paris-Bonn European Ideal 
The advocates· of the French vision of Europe, would like to see the EU evolve into a novel 
political/judicial entity 'one encompassing a close-knit federation of states, nations, and regions, with 
linked approaches to economic, social and environmental matters and an independent foreign policy. 
(Murphy 2004, p. 584) (italics added) Germany and France, since the days of Chancellor Adenauer and 
General Charles de Gaulle, have been strong proponents of such a Europe. In fact, the discourse on 
'European enlargement and integration and a dissection of the role European Union ought to play in the 
world, has a Gaullist origin. As a former president of the French Republic, General Charles de Gaulle 
sought a policy which would bring France back to its former state of "grandeur" and in doing so he was 
compelled to challenge those whom he referred to as les AnglO-Saxons, namely the British and the 
Americans. (Eflison 2007, p. 1) Critical to France's initiative was the exercise of influence and control 
over Western Europe, the development of a war-broken and divided Germany, as well as European 
integration over all. De Gaulle built on these foundations by making the European Economic Community 
(EEC) the institutional foundation of his policy of a European Europe free from American influence. 
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(Ellison 2007, p. 3) Within the new French-led Europe, de Gaullesaw France's interests converge with 
European interests to produce a European detente. For both the French and the Germans, European· 
integration would serve as a security guarantee of the post-war era. Thus, on January 22nd of 1963, a 
Franco-German Treaty of Friendship was signed between de Gaufle and Konrad Adenauer, ChanceUor of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Ostensibly, the Germans had signalled their allegiance to de Gaulle's 
vision of Europe. (Horber, 224) To counterbalance the British-American dominance in Europe, 
successive French and German governments throughout the "1970s, 1980s, and 1990s strove to 
galvanize the European Community's political, economic, and defense capabitities in order to create a 
'third force' in global affairs ... " (Pagedas 2001, 111). 
The primary objective of de GauHe's vision of Europe and the Franco-German alliance was to 
build a European Europe, a Europe outside of American influence and transatlantic strings. Britain had 
to be kept out of the Franco-German European. ideal for the fear of turning Europe into an. Atlantic 
system. (Hendriks and Morgan, 23) The grand strategy was a creation of a concert of European states 
that would serve as a means to prevent certain others, in particular Great Britain, from dragging the 
West into an Atlantic system which would be totally incompatible with a 'European Europe'{Ellison 
2007, p. 3) De Gaulle challenged American influence in Europe via drastic actions, however symbolic of 
its general trajectory was France's dual rejection of British application to the European Economic 
Community in 1963 and 1967, and France's intent to liberate itself from subordination to military 
integration in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Ellison, 1). As such, France clearly outlined 
its vision of the European Union and France's role within it: an independent France within an 
independent Europe. (Hendriks and Morgan, 24) European integration, while satisfying the needs of the 
French, would work to benefit all of Europe. 
De Gaulle's legacy outlived the Cold War and seems still influential at the beginning of the new 
millennium. Today, Franco-German European ideal is seen through somewhat the same lenses. The idea 
that Europe should be free of American influence remains strong. For example, after the end of Cold 
War, Franco-German pursuit of European autonomy and rise to a global power moved forward with 
enhanced military cooperation through the creation Of the Eurocorps and the revitalization of the 
Western European Union (WEU). This resulted in the typical US response of trying to strengthen the 
influence and role of NATO in Europe. liThe Maastricht meeting was preceded by a clash between the 
Bush administration, which wanted the WEU to be an integral part of NATO, and the Mitterrand 
. government, that adopted the Gaullist view of a Europe able to defend itself and, hence, saw the WEU 
as the military arm ofthe EC". (Mccarthy, 115) Furthermore, Franco-German coalition once again rose 
to challenge the United States in January of 2003 in their opposition to the war in Iraq. In essence such a 
position could be interpreted as an attack on the transatlantic partnership, a stance against U.S. 
influence and intentions. It remains, however, to be seen what might happen to the de Gaulle's legacy 
under Nicolas Sarkozy , the current president of France. 
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The Anglo-American 'Speciar Euro'peallldeal 
On the other side of the European integration debate is the aforementioned 'British vision'. 
Murphy refers to it as a "Ioose association of states" cooperation among which is. facilitated by 
economic, trade and financial links. (Murphy 2004, p. 584) (italics added) Emphasis here is put upon the 
extent to which Europe ought to be embedded in the Atlantic Alliance with United States. Indeed, the 
relationship between Britain and the. USA is so close and beneficial that it has become customary to 
refer to it as 'special'. Indeed, the Anglo-American idea of Europe was born out of this 'special 
relationship'. The close and natural collaboration between these two powers derives from long-shared 
political and legal traditions, close cooperative and lucrative ties in trade and investment, and last, but 
not least, from common cultural heritage. (Pagedas 2001, p. 108) The United States and Britain, since 
the days of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and currently under 
President Barak Obama and Prime Minister Gordon Brown, are the advocates of such a Europe. They are 
also two of the most vocal advocates of TUf"kish membership in the European Union. 
The idea of a special relationship' has been enthusiasticaUy endorsed by London, while 
Washington perceived it through the spectacles of British support of U.S. interests, first in World War 11, 
then throughout the Cold War, and more importantly in the post-9/ll era, particularly c in the ongoing 
Iraq War and the War on Terror. "Throughout this time, .British statesmen and historians have 
represented the Special Relationship as the anchor of foreign policy: the means by which Britain has 
ensured American sup.port of its national and international interests, and maintained an effective front 
against Communism and other threats to the world order" (Boyce 2003, pg 67). However, as Boyce 
further argues, "the two powers have enjoyed a close working relationship only when the United States 
has perceived a particular need for Britain's support" (2003, pg 67). 
In the Spring of 1964, the Foreign Office in London began to take diplomatic initiative to counter 
de Gaulleand his European ideal. On March 12,. Sir Person Dixon, Britain's Ambassador in Paris, 
cautioned that France's European trajectory and policies were aimed in an opposite direction to that 
which her Western Allies [Britain and the United States} wish to take .. (Ellison 2007a, pg 21) It could thus 
be inferred that Britain's Foreign Office advocated.closerAtlantic-European policies, stronghold of which 
was the United States. 
Indeed, "in American expectations, the British could be relied upon to act as a stabilizing 
influence, countering the actual and potential ill-effects of the Gaullist challenge and leading Western 
Europe in a direction that was sympathetic to US poliCies" .(Ellison 2007b, 105) Hence, the role that 
United States awarded to Great Britain in the 1966 NATO crisis. At the same time, the U.S. encouraged 
Britain to play a more prominent role in Europe by submitting a membership application to the 
. European Economic Community {EEC}. Washington's aim was to amplify London's influence in Europe. 
British application and subsequent membership in the EEC did not weaken the 'special' Anglo-American 
relationship, but rather acted as a catalyst for strengthening it. "The position of leadership in Europe 
that Britain desired ... was not intended to succeed relations with the US, but reinforce and supplement 
them (Ellison 2007, p. 117). The conviction in Britain was that Europe needed British leadership, and the 
Americans needed British leadership in Europe, if the 'right sort of Europe', one set within an Atlantic 
framework, should finally prevail. (Ellison 2007, p. 29) 
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In 2003, at a House of Representatives hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the 
Committee on International Relations, it was underlined that "the partnership between the United 
States and Europe not only remains relevant but is more necessary than ever in a world as uncertain as 
ours is today. Thus, the transatlantic relationship must be preserved and strengthened". (p. 1) As it is 
the case with the French idea of Europe, the English vision of Europe too is still on the British agenda 
today. This is evident from the British support of the United States in the Iraq War. Today, Britain's 
conception of itself is that of a power in its own right, American· strongest and most powerful any. The 
moral of the Anglo-American 'Special' Vision of Europe suggests that there has been and continues to be 
an Anglo-American position as to role of the European Vnion in the global context. Throughout the Cold 
War, Washington looked to Great Britain to defend the principles of the Atlantic partnership and the 
Anglo-Saxon vision of European integration. london responded readily and ·effectively. The controversy 
between the Franco-German and the British-American vision of Europe perSists and the question of 
Turkish accession to the EV may well depend on which of these two visions of Europe finally prevails. 
V.S.-Turkey Strategic Relations 
In the light on the British-American 'special' relationship, it would be beneficial to examine the 
U.S.-Turkey relations and point to the Turkey-U.S.-British triangle. Turkey's relations with Europe and 
the United States have been most active since World War 11, relations dictated mainly by the Cold War 
policy of containment of Communism. For half a century~ Turkey earned a reputation of a loyal NATO 
ally. leaders of both the United States and Turkey sought ever closer bilateral ties within a multilateral 
security framework. Strategically, Turkey identified itself with the transatlantic alliance and served as a 
stronghold against the expansion of communism, protecting the interests of the United States and the 
West in general (Flanagan and Brannen., 2008, p. 2). Although Turkey's relevance and significance 
diminished after the end of Cold War, a turning point of the Ankara-Washington relationship was the 
Gulf War of 1991. The war gave Turkey "new purpose" as it "played a key role in the V.S.-Ied campaign" 
against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. (Flanagan and Brannen., 2008, p. 2) Turkey's role, in terms of strategic 
value for the United States' interests, expanded. It was not only seen as a loya' NATO ally, but came to 
be, seen more along the lines of a stabilizing factor in the greater Middle East or even Central Asia. 
"Turkey increasingly was regarded as an anchor of stability in a region of growing volatility and was 
expected to project that stability.(Heinz 2000, p. 225) 
Furthermore, Turkey's importance for U.S. regional strategic interests expanded to include non-
security issues. In terms of "energy cooperation" Turkey was regarded as "crucial link within the east-
west energy corridor, which is promoted by the United States as the best solution for bringing Caspian 
and Central Asian energy resources to market" (Heinz 2000, p. 225) Following the tragic events of 9/11, 
Turkey's relevance once again became a priority for Washington. In 2004, at a hearing· before the 
Subcommittee on Europe of the, Committee on International Relations, it was underlined that "there is 
no greater priority for the United States in Europe than to assist the world's only Muslim-majority 
democracy, Turkey, in its effort to join the European Union" (Committee on International Relations 
2004, p. 7). Flanagan and Brannen conclude that Turkey is "instrumental" in any U.S. strategy in the 
region (2008, p. 3), notably concerning the situations in Iraq and Iran. Thanks to its geopolitical position 
in the Middle East, Turkey remains a major U.S. ally in the War on Terror and the Iraq War. 
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The E. U. Council of Ministers and the (re-)Oistribution of Power 
Power, whether absolute or relative, is one of the main components of realism. It is therefore 
improbable to discuss an issue, any issue for that matter, in realist terms without reference to it. With 
respect to the European Union enlargement, states are often concerned with new challenges that new 
Member States may pose. The prirnary concern is whether admission of the new members is relatively 
beneficial or detrimental to existing members. Such analysis of enlargement is correlated directly with 
realist emphasis upon relative power. Accordingly, Baldwin et al. claim that "one of the most sensitive 
issues surrounding expanding membership is that of power in EU institutions."(qtd. in .Aleskerov et al., 
2002,p. 380) Within the context of the European Union, in fact, states' abilities to affect decision-
making and therefore defend their interests are primarily based upon the distribution of voting power 
within the various EU institutions. The analysis here will be confined to the most significant and inter-
governmental of such institutions: the Council of Ministers of the European Union. 
To assess the past and emerging relative voting power of any single member and thus the 
distribution of such power among EU Member States, the Sharpley-Shubik Power Index is used most 
commonly. (Hosli 1996; Aleskerov et aI., 2002; Baldwin et aI., 2005) At a very basic levet;the Shapley-
Shubik Power Index can be explained in terms of a three-member voting body. Assume, for example, 
that members A, B, and C of the voting body hold five (5), three (3), and two (2) votes respectively, 
resulting in a total number of votes of ten (10), with a qualified majority vote (QMV) of six (6). As such, 
there are, as Hosli points out, 6 ways in which coalitions can be formed: {5,3,2}, {5,2,3}, {3,5,2}, {3,2,S}, 
{2,5,3}, {2,3,5}(Hosli 1996, p. 261). (The expression '!' represents 'faculty' and requires multiplication by 
every lower integer. Thus, 3! equals 3 x 2 x 1 = 6). The given members in .bold shrift are the "critical 
ones ... that ... give the marginal contribution that renders the coalition winning" (Hosli 1996, p. 261). In 
the above. example, member A is critical four out of six times, thus holding 4/6=2/3 of total voting 
power, whereas members Band C each hold 1/6 of total voting power. 
MadeJeine o. Hosti in her articfe, titled Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority 
Voting in the Council ofthe European Union, focuses upon "particular aspect of the power of Member 
States and of coalitions between members holding close policy preferences with respect to decision-
. making in the Union, namely their (quantitative) influence in the framework of qualified majority 
votes."(Hosti 1996, p. 256). Throughout the course of its evolution, the European Union has evolved 
and developed largely due to divergent interests of Member States. Prominent amongst them were 
France and Germany. So much so that it has been observed and argued that rarely were decisions made 
against the Franco-German coalition. (Hosti 1996, 259) Hosti observes that "in relative terms, the 
shares of individual members in the vote total decreased with an increase in the number of members" 
(1996, p. 263). Thus, with each additional wave of EU enlargement, the relative power of individual 
member states decreased. Hosti conveniently concludes that Franco-German allii:mce, from the 
establishment of the European Community, held nearly one-half or 46.66 per cent of the total voting 
power. That figure, however, decreased drastically to 26.84 per cent between 1986 and 1994, and by 
1996, when her article was published, had gone down to 23.34 per cent. (Hosti 1996, p. 263) Currently, 
with the power reconfiguration of EU-27, their combined Shapley-Shubik power index is only 13.11 per 
cent. (Aleskerov et aI., 2002) 
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The voting rules of the Council of the European Union were radically transformed under the 
Treaty of Nice in 2001 and the Constitutional Treaty in 2004. Although traditional qualified majority 
voting is stiff maintained within the Nice framework, additional qualification were introduced concerning 
the required number of votes and voters and the percentage of the population represented. According 
to the Nice Treaty, "the vote threshold is 72.2 percent of Council votes (232 of 321 votes); the member 
threshold is SO percent of members (13 members); and the population threshold is 62 percent of the EU 
population" (Baldwin 2005, p. 331). In the context of this essay, therefore, the relevant question is: 
what wjff be, under present rules, the impact of Turkey's EU membership on the redistribution of seats, 
voting power and power indices within the EU Council of Ministers or EU institutions generally? 
Aleskerov et al. focused primarily upon the Council of Ministers, however, in order to better 
evaluate the power distribution within EU, they broadened their research and analysis to include the 
European Parliament. In line with such an assessment, vote distribution in the Council of Ministers 
would give Turkey an equal amount of votes to that of France, Germany, and Great Britain. 
Furthermore, Turkey would seize the .second largest amount of seats· within European· Parliament, 
second to that of Germany. (see Appendix C: Vote Distribution In The case Of Enlargement in Aleskerov 
et al., 2002, p. 391) 
How, then, does this translate in terms of power re-distribution? According to Baldwin and 
Widgren, Turkey's relative power within the EU framework, in term of decision-making capabilities, 
would be quite substantial. They explicitly point out that "under either the Nice Treaty or the 
Constitutional Treaty, Turkey would be second most powerful member of the EU ... Under the 
Constitutional Treaty rules, Turkey would be substantially more powerful than France, Italy and 
Britain ... " (Baldwin 2005, 337). Indeed, power indices under the Constitutional Treaty rules in a EU-29 
show that Germany's power index would be 0.10203 and Turkey's 0.09960, followed by Great Britain at 
0.07644 and France at 0.07611. Under the Nice Treaty rules, Turkey's power index would be equivalent 
to 0.07189, again second only to that of Germany. (see table 13.1 and 13.2 in Baldwin 2005, p. 335) 
Furthermore, gain of power by one state is a loss of power by another. As pointed out earlier, relative 
power of states decreases as the number of Member States in the European Union increases. As 
Baldwin indicates, "countries relative power losses are proportional to their sizes" (Baldwin 2005, p. 
336). From such a perspective, Germany and France, currently the most populous members of the 
European Union, would suffer the most since they would lose the most voting power. 
To appreciate more fully the impact of Turkey's membership on the power redistribution within 
the EU, it is necessary to keep in mind that when states form a coalition, this results in an increase of 
their relative power, as demonstrated by Hosli'sanalysis of the Paris-Bonn axis. The. author points out 
that, when· in coalition, France and Germany have benefited from an increase of relative power, 
compared to the sum of their individual power indices. SpeCifically, "their collective Shapley-Shubik 
index was 66.67 per cent as compared to 46.66 per cent when summed over their individual shares". As 
a country with relatively large population, Turkey would play a relatively larger .role than any other 
country with less population. As a result, it could be a very important, strategic partner for any large 
state, especially if forming an alliance. And, although a state's preferences cannot bep·inpointed with 
absolute certainty, in time or space, it would be safe to presume that Turkey's alliance formation would 
not be with the Franco-German power boat, but rather with Atlanticist Great Britain; If Hosli's logic of 
coalition formation and its consequences in regards to increase of relative power are applied to a 
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probable U.K.-Turkey alliance, the increase of relative power could be estimated to be either equal to or 
greater than the Franco-German alliance. However, further analysis of this issue is surely required. For 
instance, the long term effects of the substantive and close human and economic ties between Germany 
and Turkey cannot be easily ignored and should be brought into the equation. But whatever Turkey's 
alliance preferences may turn out to be, there is no denying that its accession would certainly have a 
drastic impact upon the power re-distribution within the European Union. 
THEORETICAL APPUCATlON 
How, then, does Waltz's balance-of-power theory, enriched with ideational or constructivist 
elements, help to explain the issue of Turkey's EU membership? According to Waltz, in order for one to 
understand the relationship between units (actors) in the international political space, it is· absolutely 
necessary to define international political structure in terms of the principle by which it is ordered or 
organized. The current structure of the international political arena is that of anarchy. for, there is no 
supra-national entity which regulates the relations among at! units in the international political arena. 
No overarching authority exists to which one state can turn for justice or protection in its interaction 
with other states. The distribution of power in the anarchical system, Waltz claims, is the key 
independent variable to understanding important international outcomes such as war and peace, 
alliance politics, and the balance of power. Thus, it is imperative· to analyze the existing distribution of 
power, and the re-distribution of power that would take place within the EU, if Turkey were to be 
granted a membership status, and the consequences that this would have. 
At the political level, Turkey's membership within the European Union is seen by many as 
strengthening the anti-federalist and the· Atlanticist blocks. "Steps towards the empowerment of 
European political institutions would become more difflCult ... while the deployment of a European 
security structure independent of NATO and U.S.influence would be shelved, and a common foreign 
policy would be harder to achieve." (Grigoriadis 2006, p. 151) Indeed, this would undermine the vision 
of Europe as a counter-weight to the U.S. and would play into Washington's security doctrine. As the 
Committee on International Relations points out: 
The more important issue [for the United States) is the one of the security doctrine, and is ... to a 
large extent going to depend on the United States. Because, who is capable of deciding which security 
doctrine wifl prevail? The United States is the only one. And therefore, the doctrine will depend on the 
world vision of the United States. Right now, there clearly is a difference between the American and 
European concepts. The document which was published in September last year on the security strategy 
of the United States is based on the concept of balance of power between the major countries of the 
world underttie guidance of the United States. As such, there is no room for Europe. There is only room 
for individual member states as good allies of NATO. Right now there is no European doctrine, and there 
are no separate European resources for collective security. (po 43-44) 
The above quotation, that basically reflects the Anglo-American vision of Europe and the world, 
leaves no room for any meaningful role for the European Union in world politics. However, Germany's 
and France~s vision of the European Union - a political entity based on the rule of law - stands in clear 
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon project. This alternative vision of the European Union, as a ~wer player on 
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the international arena, should serve as a counter balance to the US hegemony and uniJateralism. 
Germany and France have formed an alliance which, with the possible help of the Eastern European 
states, could counter the United States, Great Britain, and eventually Turkey. The role of these 
contrasting visions of the European Union is thus of huge importance here, because of their potential 
impact on Turkey's membership of the EU. These divergent visions of Europe are also important 
because they confirm that the behaviour of the EU member states too could be understood in terms of 
Waltz's conceptio"n of the anarchical system, which "strongly· affects the likelihood of cooperation" 
(Waltz 1979, p. 118). EU member states too are concerned with the question of relative power or the 
balance of power, and seek alliances that better promotes their national interests and objectives, at 
home and abroad: This has also been the case of the Franco-German alliance since the end of World 
War 11. 
It is important to understan~ that state actors are constantly presented with daily choices, 
knowing that such choices and the outcomes of their decisions will have unpredictable consequences 
beyond the near future. Such conditions have clear relevance to the Turkish accession question. For, if 
its accession to the EU is successful, such a membership will have a dramatic impact on the European 
Union as a whole and wilt shift the balance of power between EU member states and their conflicting 
visions of Europe. Thus, the bigger question concerning Turkish accession to the EU goes beyond the 
Kurdish question, the human rights issues, or the political and economic standards of the Copenhagen 
criteria. Explicitly, it deals with the global balance of power and the two visions of Europe. Primarily, the 
issue concerns the position of Turkey in a form of US, and thus British, ally and a tool as a regional 
power, especially in the wake of the War on Terror, Iraq War, and Turkey's geopolitical position in the 
Middle East. This is an important iSSue, given that US-Turkish relations are focused upon the strategic 
dimension of regional and functional interests, vital to the US. (Abramowitz 2004; V.S. Committee on 
International Relations 2003) The question of Turkey's membership in the European Union is therefore 
a matter of high priority for Washington: "Anchoring Turkey in Europe has always been a u.s. priority 
because of its global role and strategic vision. In Washington, having Turkey be part of Europe and the 
transatlantic community more broadly has always been preferential to a Turkey that operates more as a 
regional counterweight with regard to Iran or Russia." (Walker 2007-08, p.'101) 
Furthermore, as long as the secular elite are in the pOSition of power and decision-making, the 
United States wilt remain influential in Turkey. Thus, it would be strategically and practically important 
for Turkey to remain anchored in the West, under the US control. The most efficient and direct means of 
achieving such a close-knit alliance with the West is via EU membership. Grigoriadis, for example, 
explicitly points out that "Turkey's membership in the European Union is seen as the best guarantee for 
the consolidation of Turkey's secular,pro-Western political system and globalized economy" (2006, p. 
151). In addition, if Turkey is tojoin the EU, the British-American idea of the European Union may be 
strengthened, whire the Franco-German vision wifl probably be weakened. The idea of relative gains and 




There are a number of realist assumptions that justify and provide a solid foundation for Waltz's 
balance of power theory, which in turn enlightens the analysis of Turkey's accession to the European 
Union. One core realist assumption holds that the structure of international system is that of anarchy. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the key units of the international system are nation states. Great 
significance is given to relative power and to the role of the relatively more powerful states. Lastly, the 
primary goal of at! units is the pursuit of power and security, and such units act rationally in order to 
achieve those goals. Another assumption that needs to be mentioned, although not a purely realist one, 
is that states' ideas and perceptions matter. The fusion of constructivist and realist approaches has here 
been examined and presented in terms of a constructive form of realism, that takes ideas seriously both 
as objects of analysis and determinants of human and state behaviour. As such, Waltz's balance of 
power theory has not been undermined~ but rather supplemented and strengthened. 
From this perspective, the balance of power theory provides an explanation for the balancing 
behaviour of states that has been observed. Indeed, among three of the most influential and powerful 
decision-makers and role players in European Union, two.are against Turkish membership, and one is in 
favour. Both Germany and France have stated publicly their opposition to Turkey's full membership of 
the European Union, in the .short run. Great Britain, on the other hand, is very much in support of 
Turkish membership. France and Germany, due to their perception of relative gains or losses as a result 
of Turkey's . accession to the EU, have expressed their opposition to its membership. The realist account 
also explains British and US stand on the issue. Turkish accession to the European Union will/would 
likely strengthen US and British power, influence and role in European and global politics. Such a shift in 
the balance. of power would be favourable to one side and unfavourable to the other. As stated earlier, 
the primary aim of all states is their own survival; whether it is defined in terms of power, security or 
territorial integrity. Contrary to the liberal theorists, who believe that international organizations, 
presumably by iimposing overarching restrains, compel states to adjust their goals, it is quite evident 
that even in the context of NATO and the EU the most important goals for the state is security, survival 
and pursuit of power. As realists contend, cooperation among nation states is possible, but only under 
certain conditions. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the pOSition of existing member countries on the question 
of Turkey's accession to the European Union is mainly influenced by two interrelated factors: their 
particular vision of the European Union and their policy vis-a-vis the United States. As it has been 
illustrated, there are two divergent visions of the European Union and its relation to the United States. 
The Franco-German political vision of the European Union as a world power, that could counterbalance 
the United States. The British vision of the European Union places instead great emphasis upon 
economic and financial matters and fully anchors the European Union within the Atlantic alliance, 
subservient to the United States. Presumably, Turkey's perception of the EU could be more in line with 
the British vision of a European Union with close transatlantic ties. In any case, the balance of power 
theory, infused with the ideational and constructivist concerns about the importance of ideas, appears 
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